Introduction
In September 1998, Jeff Pape founded WrestlingGear.com in the Chicago suburb of Franklin Park. His strategy was straightforward. In the sporting goods industry, wrestling gear represented a small, seasonal market. Every fall, young wrestlers went to local sporting goods retailers expecting to be frustrated. Limited local demand meant that stores carried only limited inventory. Few alternate retail channels existed. A former
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wrestler, Pape remembered this frustration only too well. With the arrival of the internet, he saw the possibility of helping tens of thousands of wrestlers get the gear they wanted and not having to settle for what local retailers happened to have in stock. For wrestling gear -and for many similarly structured industries -the promise of the internet was real.
Sales and distribution in thin, fragmented markets would be transformed as the internet allowed retailers to extend geographic reach, aggregate demand and centralize purchasing and fulfillment. Pape started small, initially reselling merchandise that he bought from other distributors. He gradually expanded his operation, first opening a small storefront and later borrowing $25,000 to finance inventory to shorten his fulfillment cycle. A third example brings these contrasts into focus. Few firms came to embody the opportunities (and excesses) of the Dot Com era more concretely than Amazon.
Incorporated in Seattle in July 1994 by 30-year old Princeton graduate Jeff Bezos, Amazon grew to become synonymous with the idea of electronic commerce: Bezos' capacious intellect and youthful self-confidence, his stumbling upon the internet while working on Wall Street, his methodical search for the best product to sell online, and finally, his relentless and unapologetic pursuit of growth defined a generation of entrepreneurs. The Amazon story quickly entered the realm of lore. More than a decade later, Amazon exemplified both the strengths and weaknesses of the strategies that characterized this cohort of firms. On one hand, the growth of the company was, quite simply, Amazonian. At the beginning of 2006, the company employed more than 12,000 people with offices spread across 10 countries including India and China. The company website showcased more than 30 online "stores" selling everything from baby oil to motor oil. And annual revenues approached $10 billion, strong evidence of consistent top-line growth. At the same time, however, Amazon still bore many signs of the growing pains that accompanied this rapid growth. Though nominally profitable on an operating basis, the firm showed relatively poor returns according to traditional accounting metrics. Competition from specialized firms in each of its submarkets was intense and growing, and the long-run sustainability of the Amazon business model remained uncertain. Whereas WrestingGear.com followed the traditional path of small business, Amazon and Scient pursued a strategy that came to define an entire generation of internet technology companies:
Tossing aside about every experience-honed tenet of business to build businesses in a methodical fashion, Internet businesses … adopted a grow-at-any-cost, without-any-revenue, claim-as-much-market-real-estate-before-anyone-elsemoves-in approach to business. This mentality [came] … to be known as `Get Big Fast.' 2 As many as several thousand internet firms received venture capital funding to pursue Get Big Fast (GBF). GBF was a single, prolonged bet on a future state of the world in which a select group of "winners" would dominate the e-commerce landscape. For Amazon, GBF seemed to have worked, but for Scient and many firms like it, GBF was not a winning strategy.
Each of the three firms discussed above represents an important thread in our understanding of the business history of Dot Com era firms. Get Big Fast was not always a bad idea. A handful of internet firms successfully pursued it, building large, modestly profitable businesses faster than ever before. These firms -Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon, and Monster -came to define the public image of the successful internet company. At the same time, hundreds of also-rans tried Get Big Fast, but discovered that size alone was not sufficient to secure long-term profitability. The failure of firms that had dotted the covers of business magazines, companies like Webvan, Pets.com, eToys, Boo.com, the Globe, and Scient -and the painful financial losses associated with these debaclesguaranteed a generally negative public perception of the Dot Com era. Meanwhile, lost from view, tens of thousands of internet startups followed in the footsteps of WrestlingGear.com. They started small and grew slowly. Many of these companies survived, selling products and providing valuable services online, even as public opinion continued to characterize the Dot Com era as a period of unprecedented failure.
In this paper, we establish a series of starting points for understanding the emergence of the industries associated with the commercial internet. First, we report baseline estimates of the number of internet technology companies created from [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . Approximately 50,000 companies solicited venture capital to exploit the commercialization of the internet. Of these, less than 15% followed the GBF-model of venture-backed growth. Fewer than 500 companies (<1%) had an initial public offering.
Within the larger set of initial entrants, however, the five-year survival rate was 48%. The survival rate is higher than most observers typically predict and similar to that associated with the introduction of other general purpose technologies. Standing in stark contrast to the popular picture of the Dot Com era consisting of a boom phase followed by an unprecedented bust, our findings suggest underlying continuity in the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities arising from the diffusion of a new general purpose technology.
The persistence (and conditional success) of a broad cross-section of internet technology companies allows us to reinterpret the prevailing view of the Dot Com era.
Conventional wisdom holds that internet firms were over-hyped: Bad ideas were oversold to gullible investors by entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and investment bankers playing a multi-trillion dollar game of musical chairs. When the music stopped in the spring of 2000, holders of inflated securities were left standing. These ill-fated investments, and the public perception of failure associated with these investments, led many to believe that nearly every internet firm had failed. However, observed financial losses did not, in fact, equate with firm failure. Therefore, we need a different story. In our account, the tectonic changes in the underlying entrepreneurial landscape were obscured by the financial bust. Against a highly salient backdrop of destroyed market value, we interpret the high survival rate of Dot Com firms to mean that many of the business ideas that flowered during the Dot Com era were basically sound. In other words, good ideas were oversold as big ideas.
Most internet opportunities were of modest scale -often worth pursuing -but not usually worth taking public. Because most internet business concepts were not capable of productively employing tens of millions of dollars of venture capital does not mean they were bad ideas. It does, however, imply that for most of these companies, pursuing GBF was not a good strategic decision.
Conventional Wisdom about Get Big Fast in the Dot Com Era
Following Galbraith's definition of conventional wisdom -ideas and opinions that are generally accepted by the public as true -we argue that conventional wisdom c. 1996 -2000 held that Get Big Fast was the preferred strategic choice to exploit the commercialization of the internet.
3 GBF was based on the presumption that there was a significant first mover advantage (FMA) in internet markets. First movers, it was believed, would establish preferred strategic positions, preempt later entrants, and thereby secure above-average long-term returns. A necessary corollary of early entry was rapid expansion. Firms following a GBF strategy tried to grow aggressively and make substantial investments to both acquire customers and preempt competition. entrepreneurs could credibly claim that they needed more time, more money, and greater scale to overcome operational bumps in the road and fully implement GBF. Through 1999 these claims were largely unchallenged, in part because of fundamental uncertainty about the emerging industry. No one could know whether or not the GBF strategy would work until it was tested. 10 Following Christmas 1998, the public discussion focused on the different components of implementing a GBF strategy. This discussion included such issues as the "necessity" of doubling and trebling server capacity to accommodate expected increases in web traffic, massive investments in advertising expenditures to establish market presence and increasing focus on customer service capabilities to, for instance, enable real-time online support, shorten average email response time, and ensure timely fulfillment.
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The tenor of public discussion changed as Christmas season 1999 drew near.
Marketing News, a trade publication, summarized the situation: "Retailers were caught off-guard by last year's online Christmas crush. Many experienced site outages and product shortages, while others failed to recognize the potential of e-commerce and didn't establish an online presence in time or at all." This year, however, according to Jupiter
Research analyst Ken Cassar, "They've had due warning. Although many observers ascribed ill-intent to the companies that failed at Get Big Fast, a more charitable account of the financial boom and bust that accompanied the rapid commercialization of the internet in the 1990s attributes the rampant pursuit of GBF to the fundamental uncertainty about the advisability of pursuing GBF. The capital market was munificent because this uncertainty implied a high option value for internet securities. 14 This, in turn, allowed companies to raise more capital by claiming that they needed to get even bigger and therefore grow even more before reaching profitability.
According to industry reports, e-commerce revenues in Christmas 1999 doubled or even trebled their 1998 level, but by this time, the conventional wisdom was changing. of dollars had been staked in pursuit of GBF, and lack of sufficient scale could no longer explain away the sea of red ink reported by leading Dot Com companies. After several years of unprecedented capital market munificence, uncertainty about GBF was resolved.
Hope for Get Big Fast gave way to a new certainty about the underlying realities of the technology: The option value of internet securities declined, and investors demanded results.
Moreover, this uncertainty, or at least its duration, was not entirely accidental.
Consider again the case of Amazon: Amazon stands out as one of the few firms that successfully pursued Get Big Fast. We speculate that one compelling explanation of the success of Amazon draws upon the ways in which the firm cultivated public media to build reputation in the emerging field of e-commerce and buy time for Get Big Fast to work. In this respect, no company took greater advantage of the uncertainty surrounding e-commerce and the prevailing capital market munificence than Amazon under Jeff
Bezos. Less than a year after the company website opened for business on July 16, 1995, the firm had already been featured on the cover of the Wall Street Journal. As detailed in a forthcoming comparative study by Violina Rindova and colleagues, Amazon's actions generated press coverage that attracted new customers and created opportunities for innovative strategic actions and additional public communications about these actions.
These, in turn, allowed the firm to acquire more resources, intangible and real, which Com era existed as a single iceberg. The emergence of GBF as the conventional wisdom, and perhaps, the media strategy of Amazon and similar companies, focused attention on the companies above the waterline, that is, on those that attracted the most resources, either private or public equity. These companies were visible because they managed, intentionally, to attract the attention of the business press. 16 Beneath the waterline, out of public sight, the vast bulk of Dot Com companies remained invisible to the business press and therefore to the general public. The bursting of the financial bubble that began in 2000 and accelerated through 2001 was a phenomenon that disproportionately affected the firms that had sought and received media coverage, the part of the iceberg that was above water. If the bubble was indeed that, a bubble, it should only imply that there was a fundamental problem with those firms in the public eye -and say very little about the rest of the industry. Therefore, we ask what happened to the thousands of firms that never made it into the public eye?
To make statements about the entire population of Dot Com firms, we sought ways to characterize this group. Definitions of industries abound, but often take product markets as given. We chose to focus on a resource-based definition by which an industry is comprised of firms competing for the same resources. We began with a collection of We used various methods to evaluate the representativeness of this sample.
Ideally, we would have measured characteristics of the sample and compared it to similar characteristics of the general population. However, this approach was not possible for the very reason that we were interested in it: we did not know the characteristics of the entire 17 The Archive contains metadata on more than 3,500 companies assembled from various overlapping samples of Dot-Com Era firms. 18 We are careful to use the language "solicitation" as opposed to "firm" or "entrant" as many of the groups that solicited funding never moved beyond the planning stage of their ventures nor engaged in commercial activity, and hence should not be considered entrants. While the solicitations that we consider did not receive support from the Focal VC, a significant fraction of them did receive venture financing from its competitors. According to the terms under which the sample was given to the Business Plan Archive, we are not permitted to reveal the identity of the Focal VC. Researchers are encouraged to direct inquiries to the Business Plan Archive, www.businessplanarchive.org. population. Our study was the first that claimed to be representative of the general population of Internet firms as opposed to being representative of only VC-backed or publicly traded firms. Where others had been content to limit themselves to studying the visible layers of the iceberg, we sought to assay the entire berg.
As a second-best method, we exploited the fact that a sizeable fraction of our sample received venture capital funding that was reported in a widely-used industry database, Venture Economics. We compared the venture-backed companies in our sample (VC-backed BPA firms) to the comparable population of all VC-backed companies. In this way, we would be able to determine if the funded solicitations in our sample, as judged by the venture community, were measurably different from the general population of funded solicitations.
19
We compared the VC-backed firms in the BPA sample to the total population of The results suggested that while the VC-backed BPA companies differed in some ways from the general population of VC-backed IT companies, they did so in ways that made our results easy to interpret. Controlling for founding date, the VC-backed BPA sample was biased towards firms founded during the height of the bubble. Moreover, these firms raised less money overall and less in their first successful funding rounds than did firms in the reference sample. Because funding levels are indications of the relative bargaining positions of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, the lower initial valuations and subsequent funding levels for VC-backed BPA firms suggested that the firms that approached the Focal VC were lesser-quality firms. 22 Finally, because the Focal VC was based on the east coast, VC-backed BPA firms were more likely to be located in Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania and less likely to be located in California than the average firm in the reference sample. In sum, these biases indicated that bubblefocused, low quality, east-coast firms were over-represented in the BPA sample, implying that a general survival estimate based on this sample could be reasonably interpreted as a lower bound. Returning again to the iceberg analogy, our ice core was slightly off center, but otherwise sound. 21 More than 95% of the VC-backed firms in the BPA were categorized by Venture Economics as IT-related, suggesting that our sample was accurately drawn from our study population. We employed a range of methods to evaluate the sensitivity of our estimates of venture creation activity. Our methods required strong assumptions; in a companion paper, we described our procedures in detail. For our current purposes, we take advantage of our finding that 13.2% of the solicitations recorded by the Focal VC received funding. 23 Assuming that this ratio holds across the entire population of venture-backed internet startups, for every company that received funding, 7.6 companies were seeking funding, but did not get it. Noting that there were 6,524 IT companies funded by venture capitalists between 1994 and 2002, we estimate that there were 49,582 startups seeking capital to exploit the commercialization of the internet during this period (7.6 x 6,524 = 49,582).
What was the survival rate among these approximately 50,000 ventures? How should such an estimate be interpreted? The expected value of each business can be represented as the value of the business conditional on success, multiplied by the 23 As noted in the companion paper (see note 19, above), we acquired two, related datasets from the Focal VC. One consists of a larger, low-information sample of which 15.3% received funding. Funding level in the second (high-information) sample, which serves as the principal basis of the analyses reported in the paper, is 11.1%. We use the arithmetic average of these two numbers (13.2%) in the exercise described in the text.
probability of that success. If this value is ∏, the probability of success is p and the expected value conditional on success is V , then this value can be represented as follows:
While there is little debate that the bubble reflected an increase and subsequent decrease in ∏, the source of this fluctuation, in terms of p and V, has different implications for the expected survival rate. Under one explanation, the boom and the bust reflected the emergence and subsequent disappearance of new business opportunities, a rise and subsequent decline of p. In this scenario, the "bust" represented the collective and cumulative recognition that these opportunities were at best, highly uncertain, if not evanescent. Over time, in this view, investors discovered that what they believed were good ideas -ideas with a high probability of success -were in fact bad, or low probability, ideas. The great explosion of new ventures formed during the run up to the collapse was thus unsustainable, and the spate of reported failures a consistent reaction to over-optimism and excess entry. If this explanation was correct, the failure rate of ventures formed during the Internet era should have exceeded typical rates of failure, especially as the period dragged on and the most profitable opportunities were exhausted.
A competing explanation attributes the "bust" phase of the Internet bubble to changes in financial markets, rather than product markets. 24 In Equation (1), this scenario would be represented by a rise and decline of V. In this case, the underlying opportunity structure created by the advent of the commercial Internet was relatively unaffected by gyrations in capital markets. That is, there was a technology shock: the emergence of a commercial sector to exploit opportunities associated with a general purpose technology, the internet. The boom and bust reflected only "irrational exuberance" with respect to the valuation of new opportunities, rather than their viability. As a result of the bust, the perceived payoffs associated with new venture success declined from their previously unwarranted levels. In terms of Equation (1), investors believed they were investing in big ideas -ideas with a high expected value (V). The bust represented the discovery that the ideas were smaller than promised. Potential growth and value of a typical Internet startup was more limited than had been previously thought, but failure rates, under this scenario, would have been lower than during normal periods of entrepreneurship, consistent with the Schumpeterian hypothesis of secular technological change creating new entrepreneurial opportunities. Furthermore, if the bust was a reflection of a decline in business valuations as opposed to viability -driven, say, by the realization that GBF was not widely applicable -a focus on the visible (i.e., financial market) part of the phenomenon would have overestimated the magnitude of the decline. The conventional wisdom about GBF and the Dot Com bust described above is consistent with this view.
With this framework in mind, we researched the fate of the firms in the BPA sample. Of the 1,165 firms in the BPA sample, 214 were classified as "never entered."
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Our sample was therefore reduced to 951 entrants. We investigated the status of the startups in our sample in the spring of 2005. First, we checked the status of the firm on 25 In the iceberg analogy, the non-entrants might be seen as loose ice around the bottom of the berg.
the Web. We determined whether the service described in the business plan was still available. To further investigate continuity of ownership, we compared management team profiles to those observed in the planning documents. If we suspected an acquisition, or if the service was no longer available, we consulted two additional sources, the Internet Archive and Lexis-Nexis. Using the "Wayback Machine," an interface provided by the Internet Archive which provides snapshots of website changes over time, we determined the date of exit (if the firm exited). Where we identified web domains that had been acquired or developed by a new team in pursuit of a different opportunity, we inferred that the original business had failed. To test for the presence of phantom firms (or "the living dead"), we used several criteria. If it was clearly not possible to procure a service, we assumed that the business had failed (there were several examples where the website was "under construction" for several years). Also, websites commonly report when they were last updated, and the Internet Archive reports when the website last changed. If this date was before 2003, we suspected that the business had failed. When it was more recent than 2003, but the website was very unprofessional, we also suspected that the business had failed. We then tried to procure the services offered on the website (when appropriate) and/or contact the individuals who ran the website. Often, this latter strategy settled the issue. If it did not, and we were unable to procure a service, we categorized the business as failed. All in all, there were 40 firms with live websites that we categorized as failed using the above criteria.
For the sample, we report exit rates by year in Table 1 - Table 1 about here
We compared our failure rates to other studies of industry survival. In a study of nearly 300,000 U.S. manufacturing firms over the 1963-1982 period, Timothy Dunne and colleagues found exit rates similar to ours. The 1963-1967 cohort of firms had a 42% cumulative exit rate after four years. Similarly, the five-year cohorts from 1967-1982 had exit rates of 58%, 64%, and 63%, respectively. Taking a finer-grained look at the plant data also shows comparable failure rates among firms that entered through the construction of new plants, a category arguably most comparable to our sample of new dotcom firms: From 1967-1982, the three five-year cohorts had cumulative exit rates of 64%, 57%, and 64%, all of which are somewhat higher than the five-year exit rate in our sample. 26 In a follow-up study of over 200,000 U.S. manufacturing plant entrants in two five-year cohorts, 1967 five-year cohorts, -1972 five-year cohorts, and 1972 five-year cohorts, -1977 viability of the GBF business strategy. The bust reflected a decrease in valuations to more realistic levels.
Conclusion
The closing years of the twentieth century produced a critical moment for entrepreneurial capitalism. Beginning in the mid-1990s and lasting through the stock market peak in 2000, this period saw unprecedented levels of technology entrepreneurship, venture capital investment, initial public offerings, and finally, wild price gyrations in public markets on which shares of these new companies were traded.
Returning to WrestlingGear.com, Scient and Amazon--we suggest that another principal distinction between these three firms lay in the fact that a typical reader of the business press during the hey-day of the internet boom might have heard of Scient, and certainly heard of Amazon. But unless that person was also a wrestler or the parent or coach of a wrestler, s/he would have never known that WrestlingGear.com existed. This contrast applies more broadly: The Icarian arcs of a handful of high-flying internet companies occupied the bulk of public attention both on the way up and on the way down. In the public eye, these stories came to represent the totality of internet entrepreneurship in the 1990s, even as thousands of successful, if less spectacular, internet companies followed a more traditional growth trajectory, survived and even thrived.
This study has allowed us to see the ways in which WrestingGear.com, Scient and Amazon were typical Dot Com startups. Scient typified the venture-backed gazelles that captured the public imagination and ultimately cost investors many billions of dollars.
Today, its principal narrative of rise and fall is the prevailing story -the conventional wisdom -that most observers associate with the Dot Com Era. By contrast, WrestlingGear.com typified the counter-narrative, a traditional, behind-the-scenes story of entrepreneurial opportunity identification and exploitation that is remarkable for its normalcy. Amazon stands out as one of the few firms that successfully pursued Get Big
Fast, but as we have seen, its success has obscured the many, viable and small internet businesses enabled by the internet. Taken together, these findings -the concentration of resources in too few large ventures pursuing Get Big Fast, the normal to higher-than-normal survival rate, and the full extent of companies created -suggest that previous accounts of venture creation in the Dot Com Era have understated the extent of the phenomenon. Technology entrepreneurship in the Dot Com Era was more successful than people imagine today, and there was more of it than originally reported. To return to the formal relationship presented in Equation (1), the probability of success (p) for a given Dot Com Era venture was normal or slightly higher than normal, but the valuation associated with that outcome (V) was inflated by external gyrations in the financial markets. If the Dot Com Era had been the result of an irrational cascade of bad business ideas, the observed failure rate would have been higher, not lower than the average in other emerging industries.
Regardless of the wild swings in the perceived value of new Internet ventures, their high survival rate underscores the idea that the ventures were created in response to real changes in the underlying opportunity landscape. Thus, in the mistaken pursuit of Get Big Fast, many good opportunities were oversold to investors and the public as big opportunities. As the bubble burst, valuations were brought into line with the realistic scale of the typical online venture, but the underlying, exogenous change in Table 1 : Cumulative exit rate by year-entry cohort. Cumulative exit rate is the weighted mean of the exit rates for each cohort and represents the cumulative exit rate of firms in the sample in the various years. Total at period start is the total number of firms in operation during that year. Exits is the number of firms that ceased operating during that year.
